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Forthcoming in Modern Law Review 
The Chinese Social Credit System: A Model for Other Countries? 
 
 
Daithí Mac Síthigh* and Mathias Siems† 
 
 
Abstract: Many countries know financial consumer credit ratings, and recent years have 
also seen a proliferation of rating systems in relation to online platforms and in the 
‘sharing economy’, such as eBay, Uber and Airbnb. In the view of many Western ob-
servers, however, the emerging Chinese Social Credit System indicates a paradigm shift 
compared to these former rating systems as it aims for a comprehensive and uniform 
social rating based on penalty and award mechanisms. By contrast, this article suggests 
that the evolving forms of the Chinese system should be seen as a specific instance of a 
wider phenomenon. Thus, it develops a framework that compares different rating sys-
tems by reference to their drafters, users, aims, scoring systems, application, use of al-
gorithms, enforcement and accountability; it identifies shortcomings of both low and 
high interventionist rating systems; and it discusses a range of regulatory approaches 
and emerging issues that law makers should consider. 
Keywords: Social Credit System, Chinese law, credit registries, reputation rankings, 
online platforms, law and technology 
 
 
 ‘It would be easy to assume none of this could happen here in the West.  
But the 21st century is not going to work like that’.1 
 
‘China’s dystopian tech could be contagious’2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 2000s the Chinese government has pursued plans for the construction of 
a so-called ‘Social Credit System’. Implementation is progressing quickly, and it can be 
suggested that the Social Credit System will fundamentally change the life of all Chi-
nese citizens. In a nutshell,3 the main innovation, once fully implemented, could be that 
each Chinese citizen will be given a score measuring their sincerity, honesty, and integ-
rity, and that this score will then be a major determinant for their lives, for instance, 
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1 J. Harris, ‘The tyranny of algorithms is part of our lives: soon they could rate everything we do’ The 
Guardian (5 March 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/05/algorithms-rate-
credit-scores-finances-data.  
2 A. Greenfield, ‘China’s Dystopian Tech Could Be Contagious’ The Atlantic (14 February 2018) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/chinas-dangerous-dream-of-urban-
control/553097/. 
3 For details see text to notes 95-155, below. 
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whether to be able to get a credit, rent a flat, or buy a plane ticket, or being given pre-
ferred access to hospitals, universities and government services. 
In this Chinese government programme, the notion of ‘social credit’ serves as an exten-
sion of mere financial scoring systems from elsewhere in the world,4 given that the Chi-
nese ‘social credit’ score will consider a wide range of personal factors.5 It also resem-
bles, but goes further than, a range of systems that are intended to increase the promi-
nence of reputation in relation to transactions, online platforms and in the ‘sharing 
economy’. In addition, the Chinese initiative will cover both companies and individuals; 
the latter is more novel (and more controversial), given the prevalence of ratings for the 
former in the financial sector and in fields such as corporate social responsibility.6 Thus, 
we focus here on rating systems concerning individual persons. 
This article is motivated by the fact that it cannot be assumed that ‘what happens in 
China, stays in China’. The Social Credit System already applies to foreign workers and 
companies in China, and possibly also to all ‘overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese’ re-
gardless of their place of residence.7 In addition, it can be observed that China’s eco-
nomic, political and ideological influence leads to a general diffusion of Chinese law; 
writings about China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the ‘Beijing consensus’ of development 
assistance, and the impact of Chinese investments in Africa show that China’s influence 
abroad is not merely of an economic nature but that it increasingly shapes law and poli-
cy elsewhere.8 
It may of course be argued that the Social Credit System is something that should be 
seen as not a model but as a counter-model for other countries.9 We seek to provide a 
critical but also nuanced and measured assessment, against a backdrop of typical ‘West-
ern’ responses which simply dismiss the Social Credit System as ‘Orwellian’, and a 
general lack of any critical debate on the topic in China.10 In particular, this article will 
identify the many variations within the development of the Social Credit System in Chi-
na,11 while also addressing debates on the importance of reputation and grading/ranking 
and on the power of algorithms. We argue, therefore, that what is happening in China 
can be seen as a specific instance of a wider phenomenon. Even more so, as reputation-
based quantitative tools have become established in the West, the Social Credit System 
                                                 
4 See text to notes 13-93, below. 
5 The term ‘social credit’ has also two further meanings that are outside the scope of this article, namely, 
as an economic reform programme developed in the 1920s (see C.H. Douglas, Social Credit(Vancouver: 
Institute of Economic Democracy, 1924)) and as a type of ‘micro-credit aiming at fighting poverty’ (see 
F.A.F. Ferreira et al, ‘A Socio-Technical Approach to the Evaluation of Social Credit Applications’ 
(forthcoming) Journal of the Operational Research Society DOI: 10.1080/01605682.2017.1415650). 
6 Despite many differences, see eg L.C. Backer, ‘Next Generation Law: Data Driven Governance and 
Accountability Based Regulatory Systems in the West, and Social Credit Regimes in China’, Working 
Paper (7 July 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209997. 
7 See S. Hoffman, ‘Social credit: technology-enhanced authoritarian control with global consequences’, 
Policy Brief Report No.6/2018. 
8 See eg S. Seppänen, ‘Chinese Legal Development Assistance: Which Rule of Law? Whose Pragma-
tism?’ (2018) 51 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 101; W. Zhang, I. Alon and C. Lattemann 
(eds), China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Changing the Rules of Globalization (Cham: Palgrave, 2018). 
9 Or if it were to influence other countries, it may be argued that it should be seen as a ‘malicious legal 
transplant’, cf M. Siems, ‘Malicious Legal Transplants’ (2018) 38 Legal Studies 103. 
10 See further text to notes 127-155, below. 
11 See further text to notes 95-137, below. 
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may tell us something about their evolution in Western countries (or even the future of 
global normative orders12). 
Accordingly, this article is interested in a number of overlapping research questions: to 
start with, how can we understand both the multiple Chinese and Western systems by 
reference to their drafters, users, aims, scoring systems, application, use of algorithms, 
enforcement and accountability? Is it then the case that the Social Credit System is 
based on a unique strongly interventionist logic, or could there be mixtures between the 
Chinese and Western models? And if reputation and rating systems consolidate in 
Western markets in a similar fashion, what opportunities, features, controversies, and 
pitfalls will arise? And how could law makers intervene if this happens?  
The corresponding structure of this article is as follows. The next part maps the general 
debate about reputation, ranking and rating in the West (setting out salient features of its 
history in credit scoring and related systems, and identifying the significance of reputa-
tion data for online business and the ‘sharing’ or peer-to-peer economy); we conclude 
this part by considering certain controversies regarding such data, and setting out an ini-
tial framework for analysis. The following part explains the operation and variations of 
China’s Social Credit System today as well as likely future developments. On this basis, 
the subsequent part compares and evaluates both of these systems, identifying short-
comings of low and high interventionist rating systems, and assessing a range of regula-
tory approaches, followed by a conclusion. 
REPUTATION, RANKING, AND RATING 
A short history  
Although the identification and dissemination of reputational information has formed an 
important aspect of 21st-century e-commerce and sharing economy business models, the 
concept is certainly a more established one. The best known is probably found in the 
financial sector, where the ‘rating’ of the creditworthiness of companies, institutions, 
individuals, and financial instruments (e.g. bonds) has a longer history,13 and has pro-
gressed beyond narrower, single-purpose origins to becoming a ‘key component of 
global financial governance’.14 
In Lauer’s history of the development of consumer credit reporting and scoring in the 
United States since the 19th century, he emphasises the development of an information 
infrastructure in finance, including shifts towards a quantitative basis throughout the 
20th century, and computerisation and the application of statistical methods to risk and 
creditworthiness from the 1960s onwards.15 Other significant developments include the 
emphasis upon individual ‘scores’ in the late 20th century,16 and continuous monitoring 
and surveillance rather than simple blacklisting17 (or, as Pasquale puts it regarding the 
                                                 
12 cf L.C. Backer, ‘And an Algorithm to Bind them All? Social Credit, Data Driven Governance, and the 
Emergence of an Operating System for Global Normative Orders’, Working Paper (21 May 2018), avail-
able at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182889. 
13 D. Marron, Consumer Credit in the United States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 100. 
14 B. Carruthers, ‘From Uncertainty Toward Risk: The Case of Credit Ratings’ (2013) 11 Socio-Economic 
Review 525, 530. 
15 J. Lauer, Creditworthy: A History of Consumer Surveillance and Financial Identity in America (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2017) 40 and 183. 
16 ibid 249. 
17 Marron, n 13 above, 105-107; Lauer, n 15 above, 60. 
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21st century, the move to a ‘scored society’ in place of mere credit scores18). These de-
velopments sit within the a longer trajectory towards increased access to information 
which has, since the 18th century, driven ‘fact- and theory-based approaches to issues of 
finance and credit’ (in respect of individuals and companies) and attempted to neutralise 
‘irrationality’ and misunderstanding19 and replace uncertainty with an assessment of 
risk.20 The increased involvement of mainstream banks in credit scoring, from the 1960s 
onwards, has also supported an algorithmic-led approach to risk and the likelihood of 
repayment.21 
Credit scoring has also developed in the UK and across Europe22 – although different 
legal and cultural approaches to data protection have meant that the pace of change has 
been different. Corporate transactions, such as the acquisition of Experian (formerly 
TRW, a major player from the computer age in the US23) by Great Universal Stores (a 
UK-based mail order retailer which had developed a successful credit scoring function 
of its own24), have promoted further convergence. 
These financial matters form part of a broader trend. Classification systems and the urge 
to classify have deep roots in human societies, but were a major feature of scientific and 
capitalist development in the 20th century; they are ubiquitous and built into every as-
pect of social and commercial life, and combine ‘social organization, moral order, and 
layers of technical integration’.25 The late 20th century also saw the rise in popularity of 
key performance indicators, ‘league tables’, and the like, as part of the New Public 
Management revolution26 and a shift towards the ‘production of performance infor-
mation with regulatory or quasi-regulatory purposes’27. Well-known examples include 
assigning core research funding to universities in the United Kingdom (and, increasing-
                                                 
18 F. Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015) 22-25. See also R. Botsman and R. Rogers, What’s Mine is 
Yours: How Collaborative Consumption is Changing the Way we Live (New York: Collins, 2010) 217 (on 
how the 20th-century importance of credit ratings relates to ‘consumers operating in a hyper-
individualistic world’ rather than the position of individuals within a community). 
19 J. Black, The Power of Knowledge: How Information and Technology Made the Modern World (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2014) 193. 
20 Carruthers, n 14 above, 529. 
21 Lauer, n 15 above, 191. 
22 T. Wainwright, ‘Elite Knowledges: Framing Risk and the Geographies of Credit’ (2011) 43 Environ-
ment & Planning A 650, 653 (highlighting the later adoption of methods in the UK, influenced by US 
practices); A. Rona-Tas and A. Guseva, ‘Consumer Credit in Comparative Perspective’ (2018) 44 Annual 
Review of Sociology 55, 62-64 (for a general survey). 
23 Marron, n 13 above, 104. 
24 N. Cope, ‘GUS shares soar on £1bn acquisition’ The Independent (15 November 1996). Ten years later, 
the (combined) credit scoring business was demerged: S. English, ‘Experian to raise new equity in de-
merger from GUS’ The Independent (29 March 2006).  
25 G. Bowker and S. Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1999) 33, 37 (ubiquity), 3-5 (historical understandings), 324-325 (integration into information 
systems). 
26 C. Pollitt and G. Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 106-111; C. Hood and R. Dixon, A Government that Worked Better and Cost 
Less?: Evaluating Three Decades of Reform and Change in UK Central Government (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015) ch 3; W. Nelson Espeland and M. Sauder, ‘Rankings and Reactivity: How Public 
Measures Recreate Social Worlds’ (2007) 113 American Journal of Sociology 1. 
27 A. Mehrpouya and R. Samiolo, ‘Performance Measurement in Global Governance: Ranking and the 
Politics of Variability’ (2016) 55 Accounting, Organizations and Society 12, 13. 
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ly, elsewhere),28 and the evaluation of federal government programmes in the United 
States.29 The economic impact of prizes for contemporary art30 and the grading of res-
taurants31 has been observed.  
For individuals in labour markets, we see schemes such as quantitative approaches to 
determining the promotion of civil servants in the European Union.32 In the last year 
alone, new developments in the UK include a requirement (imposed by competition and 
financial regulators) that financial institutions provide information on how likely cus-
tomers would be to recommend their services to others,33 and a proposed extension of a 
scheme attempting to measure the quality of university teaching beyond institutions to 
individual subjects, described by the responsible Minister as akin to the financial ser-
vices comparison site MoneySupermarket.34 These ‘calculative practices [which] render 
previously incomparable elements visible and comparable’35, while mostly focused up-
on institutions rather than individuals, normalise the collection and communication of 
data in this fashion, and allow for more effective methods of presentation and analysis.  
As well as highlighting the benefits of an ‘objective’ approach,36 contemporary versions 
of credit scoring and New Public Management also have in common a tendency to col-
lect and analyse data at a relatively centralised level; that is, it is the credit scoring 
agency or the public audit authority that is gathering data (albeit from multiple sources) 
and providing advice (or at least aggregated and sometimes ranked data) on the perfor-
mance, solvency, or quality of the data subjects. In other cases, however, the ‘score’ 
(whether concerning an individual or an institution) will simply reflect the data submit-
ted by users of a given service – whether that be regarding the service provider or, as in 
the case of certain online businesses, other service users.  
                                                 
28 R. van Gestel, ‘Ranking, Peer Review, Bibliometrics and Alternative Ways to Improve the Quality of 
Doctrinal Legal Scholarship’ in R. van Gestel, H.-W. Micklitz and E. Rubin (eds), Rethinking Legal 
Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); M. Henkel and 
M. Kogan, ‘United Kingdom’ in D. Dill and F. van Vught (eds), National Innovation and the Academic 
Research Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
29 J. Gilmour, ‘Implementing OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART): Meeting the Challenges 
of Integrating Budget and Performance’ (2007) 7 OECD Journal on Budgeting 1. 
30 P. Pénet and K. Lee, ‘Prize & Price: The Turner Prize as a Valuation Device in the Contemporary Art 
Market’ (2014) 43 Poetics 149. 
31 L. Karpik, Valuing the Unique: The Economics of Singularities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
Eng tr, 2010) 77-80. 
32 eg Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, Regulation 259/68, [1968] OJ L 56/1 (as 
amended); see further C. Ban, ‘Performance Appraisal and Promotion in the European Commission: the 
Challenge of Linking Organizational and Individual Accountability’ (conference paper, Accountability 
and Governance in International Organizations, Konstanz, June 2008) 
http://www.pitt.edu/~cban/Research/Ban%20EC%20accountability%20paper.doc  
33 Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Banks scored on quality of service’ (15 August 2018) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/banks-scored-on-quality-of-service; Financial Conduct Authority, 
‘Making it easier to use and compare current accounts’ (15 August 2018) 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stories/making-it-easier-use-and-compare-current-accounts. 
34 Department for Education, ‘Universities to be rated by subject quality’ (12 March 2018) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/universities-to-be-rated-by-subject-quality; see Eleanor Busby, 
‘University degree courses to be ranked in “MoneySuperMarket” style system, minister says’ The Inde-
pendent (12 March 2018) https://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/degree-
courses-university-students-rankings-teaching-excellence-framework-sam-gyimah-a8251866.html. 
35 M. Kornberger and C. Carter, ‘Manufacturing Competition: How Accounting Practices Shape Strategy 
Making in Cities’ (2010) 23 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 325, 332. 
36 As emphasised by Marron, n 13 above, 104. 
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From eBay to Uber and beyond 
The success of eBay and related sites has long been attributed, in part, to the way in 
which a platform has become ‘trusted’ by users and how well-understood information 
asymmetries are handled and countered. Trust in a sales platform is said to be a combi-
nation of payment security, reliable and affordable schemes for dispute resolution, and – 
of present interest – ‘trust building measures like the mutual rating system which allows 
for online reputation’.37 eBay’s reputation system, where buyers and sellers rate each 
other (with comments published for all to see), was added very shortly after it began 
business, in order to address allegations of cheating; it became an established feature of 
the site and is still in operation.38 Indeed, the different aspects of trust are interlinked as, 
for instance, a failure to engage with the dispute resolution process affects the reputation 
of a user.39 Moreover, a user’s ability to trade in the future will be affected by their 
score and feedback and therefore by their earlier actions:40 eBay’s system has seen high 
levels of participation, with traders with positive reputations found to be more likely to 
succeed in selling items on the platform,41 and it also allows eBay to exclude from the 
marketplace users with very low ratings.42 
Present-day observers note that online trust encompasses ‘digital social capital’ and var-
ious means of certifying and validating market participants.43 Similarly, Facebook has 
recently confirmed that it maintains an internal system through which all users are rated 
for how ‘trustworthy’ they are,44 though its current function appears to be limited, being 
only Facebook’s own use in enforcing its own rules against its users. These present-day 
approaches however draw upon a longer history of identifying the reliability of individ-
uals: Lauer highlights how credit systems which valorised character and hard work ra-
ther than social standing were an important facilitator of the emergence of US consumer 
capitalism,45 while Packin and Lev-Aretz point to the more recent use of big data and 
the analysis of ‘online social footprints’ as a proxy for character, which in the history of 
credit scoring is seen as a reliable predictor of the ability and likelihood of repayment.46 
Unsurprisingly, the overlapping developments in reputation, big data, analytics, and In-
ternet-driven business models, lead some to conclude that we now live in a ‘reputation 
economy’ where reputation is an asset.47 
                                                 
37 G.-P. Calliess, ‘Online Dispute Resolution: Consumer Redress in a Global Market Place’ (2006) 7 
German Law Journal 647, 652. 
38 C. Shirky, Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age (London: Allen Lane, 2010) 
177-178. 
39 Calliess, n 37 above, 653. 
40 Botsman and Rogers, n 18 above, 140. 
41 P. Resnik and R. Zeckhauser, ‘Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical Analysis of 
eBay’s Reputation System’ in M. Baye (ed), The Economics of the Internet and E-commerce (London: 
Emerald, 2002). 
42 C. Lampe, ‘The Role of Reputation Systems in Managing Online Communities’ in H. Masum and M. 
Tovey (eds), The Reputation Society: How Online Opinions Are Shaping The Offline World (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2012) 82. 
43 A. Sundararajan, The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-based Capital-
ism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016) 61. 
44 E. Dwoskin, ‘Facebook is rating the trustworthiness of its users on a scale from zero to 1’ Washington 
Post (22 August 2018). 
45 Lauer, n 15 above, 26, 33. 
46 N. Geslevich Packin and Y. Lev-Aretz, ‘On Social Credit and the Right To Be Un-networked’ [2016] 
Columbia Business Law Review 339, 343. 
47 M. Fertik and D. Thompson, The Reputation Economy (New York: Random House, 2015). 
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As the ‘sharing economy’ or ‘collaborative economy’ emerged as the latest Internet 
phenomenon (and business catchphrase) in recent years, the role of reputational systems 
has also been obvious. The sharing economy purports to be based around interpersonal 
relations and seeking to replace ‘functional, cold and impersonal relations engendered 
by capitalism’ with authenticity and trust.48 Consequently, all major economy platforms, 
such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit, and indeed precursors such as CouchSurfing, 
make use of a combination of scoring and feedback systems.49 The availability of a 
community of users familiar with eBay-like feedback schemes and social media ser-
vices, and the technological innovation that facilitated reputation-based services on ear-
lier sites, is a factor in the rapid adoption of sharing economy services.50 Indeed, the 
wider economic shift towards peer-to-peer provision, and indeed the reshaping of labour 
markets in the ‘gig’ economy, continues to see reputational information emphasised as a 
key component of the model. 
How is reputational data used in these contexts? An obvious example is ridesharing ser-
vices, where drivers and passengers rate each other. A driver with a comparatively low 
score (the aggregate of passenger scores) can ultimately be removed from the platform 
or restricted to providing a more limited range of services,51 while a passenger is more 
likely to be picked up if they have a high rating from past drivers52 (passenger ratings 
were formerly not visible to passengers or required effort to view, but a 2017 change 
means that a passenger now sees their own rating each time they use the app).53 Airbnb 
feedback often includes detailed accounts of visitor experiences, with hosts having the 
opportunity to add their own comments in reply; a good reputation score for a host 
means that their accommodation may be returned at the top of search results.54 A good 
reputation appears to be correlated with an ability to demand higher prices, though there 
is variation between how the strength of reputation is measured (e.g. mean score vs 
                                                 
48 N. John, The Age of Sharing (Malden: Polity Press, 2017) 148. 
49 Botsman and Rogers, n 18 above, 178-179 (reputation on couchsurfing.com), 217 (‘with the Web we 
leave a reputation trail’, ie ‘a cumulative record of how well we collaborate and if we can be trusted’). 
50 Sundararajan, n 43 above, 25; B. Stone, The Upstarts: How Uber, Airbnb and the Killer Companies of 
the New Silicon Valley are Changing the World (London: Transworld 2017) 10-11 (‘Airbnb and Uber 
substituted [for older regulatory regimes] the self-policing tools pioneered by internet marketplaces like 
eBay – riders graded their drivers and guests evaluated their hosts, and vice versa’); J. Klein, ‘Baby, you 
can drive my car’ Time (9 February 2015) 34 (‘the key to this shift was the discovery that while we totally 
distrust strangers, we totally trust people … many sharing-company founders have one thing in common: 
they worked at eBay and, in bits and pieces, recreated that company’s trust and safety division … its in-
novation was getting both the provider and the user to rate each other’). 
51 In the early (2012) service Sidecar, drivers were only eligible to use the platform if their score remained 
above a required minimum: Stone, n 50 above, 197-198. Uber allows drivers with higher ratings to pro-
vide higher-priced services (Uber Exec and Uber Lux): Uber BV v Aslam (UK Employment Appeals Tri-
bunal, 10 November 2017) [9] and deactivates (after notices and opportunities to improve) the accounts 
of drivers with low ratings – below 4.4 out of 5 (ibid, [29], [56]) – or, allegedly, below 4.7 in some situa-
tions: T. Slee, What’s Yours is Mine: Against the Sharing Economy (Toronto: Scribe, 2017) loc 1286. 
52 R. Rose, ‘The shame of my very low Uber rating’ Financial Times (4 July 2018). On identifying relia-
ble customers for new business models through reputation systems, see L. Gansky, The Mesh: Why the 
Future of Business is Sharing (New York: Penguin, 2010) 105. 
53 M. Truong and R. Trivedi, ‘Updates to the rating system’ (Uber, 26 April 2017) 
http://www.uber.com/en_GB/newsroom/ratingsupdate-2/. 
54 G. Zervas, D. Prosperio and J. Byers, ‘A First Look at Online Reputation on Airbnb, Where Every Stay 
is Above Average’, Working Paper (25 January 2015), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2554500.  
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number of positive reviews).55 Another example of the use of reputational mechanisms 
is ‘gamification’, where platforms build in tools inspired by the mechanisms developed 
and perfected within the computer game sector for other purposes,56 to incentivise good 
behaviour and drive active participation and engagement over a longer period.57 Such 
tools (which are also being used in other sectors, such as education) include progress 
between levels, the collection of points, and the availability of rewards.58  
Regulating rating and reputation systems 
What is the role of the state, and of various means of legal control or oversight, in the 
systems discussed in the above paragraphs? In a limited number of cases, state authori-
ties have initiated schemes that purport to ‘rate’ individuals (albeit on a simpler basis of 
passing a threshold rather than a comprehensive ranking). For instance, some countries 
use a point-based immigration system.59 In other cases (and more characteristic of the 
development of these systems in the countries discussed in this part), the nexus between 
the state and rating and reputation systems is through acquiescence and encouragement, 
or through a self- or co-regulatory model, rather than the system being managed by a 
public authority.60  This can be observed by reference to credit scoring and to the shar-
ing economy. 
While consumer credit scoring has predominantly been a private sector activity, it has 
certainly benefitted from seemingly unrelated aspects of public administration, such as 
the creation of a unique identifier for individuals in the US for social security purpos-
es.61 Public bodies engaged with the financial system can also play a role in standardis-
ing the use of private data through the exercise of their functions.62 More generally, the 
                                                 
55 W. Qiu, P. Parigi and B. Abrahao, ‘More Stars or More Reviews? Differential Effects of Reputation on 
Trust in the Sharing Economy’ [2018] Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems 153. 
56 eg ‘taking things that aren’t games and trying to make them feel more like games’: F. Escribano, ‘Gam-
ification As the Post-Modern Phalanstère’ in P. Zackariasson and T. Wilson (eds), The Video Game In-
dustry: Formation, Present State, and Future (New York: Routledge, 2014) 201; ‘providing us with vol-
untary obstacles related to our real-world activity and by giving us better feedback really can help us 
make a better effort’: J. McGonigal, Reality is Broken: Why Games Make Us Better and How They Can 
Change the World (London: Vintage, 2012) 148. 
57 J. Hamari, M. Sjöklint and A. Ukkonen, ‘The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collabora-
tive Consumption’ (2016) 67 Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology 2047 (in 
general); Slee, n 51 above, loc 1274 (Uber drivers); S. Mason, ‘High score, low pay: why the gig econo-
my loves gamification’ The Guardian (20 November 2018) 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/nov/20/high-score-low-pay-gamification-lyft-uber-drivers-
ride-hailing-gig-economy (Lyft drivers).  
58 eg A. DuVernet, A. Asquer and I. Krackkovskaya, ‘The Gamification Of Education and Business: A 
Critical Analysis and Future Research Prospects’ in F.X. Olleros and M. Zhegu (eds), Research Hand-
book on Digital Transformations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016); on gamification, e-learning, and 
student performance, see D. Willetts, A University Education (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 
333. 
59 For the discussion see eg, D.G. Papademetriou and M. Sumption, ‘Rethinking Points Systems and Em-
ployer-Selected Immigration’, Report of the Migration Policy Institute (2011), available at 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/rethinking-points-systems-and-employer-selected-immigration. 
For the Chinese point system for internal migration see n 147, below.  
60 On the wide spectrum of self/co-regulatory models in relation to data and technology, see eg C. 
Marsden, Internet Co-regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy in Cyberspace 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) ch 2. 
61 Lauer, n 15 above, 198-199. 
62 Lauer, n 15 above, 249 (on the use of private credit scores in the Government-based home lending sys-
tem in the 1990s, and how it contributed to the success of and adoption of changes in scoring); Wain-
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(private) rating of bonds has long played a role in public finances, including statutory 
requirements.63 
The nature of sharing economy business models, where there is limited regulatory en-
gagement in many cases, leads to heavy emphasis being placed by users on the quality 
of reputational information provided through the platform.64 Moreover, whether any 
liability is potentially attached to the very act of ranking, reviewing, or rating is a factor; 
US law generally takes the approach that a view on creditworthiness or a review (or 
even scoring) of a service is an opinion protected by the First Amendment as an aspect 
of freedom of speech,65 while minimising exposure to defamation claims has long been 
a concern for the credit rating industry and for (non-sharing) online review sites alike.66 
Where there is concern about the implications of rating, there will be the possibility of 
the introduction of a regulatory regime or the application of more general provisions. 
This may be correlated with the degree to which ostensibly voluntary participation by 
users in a private sector market begins to become an everyday activity, which facilitates 
access to other markets or displaces more conventionally regulated services. Credit 
scoring, for instance, became the subject of specific regulation in the US.67 Calls for 
greater regulation in other areas, on the basis of criticisms of the status quo in rating and 
reputation-based systems, are discussed in the comparative part, below.68 
Recent trends: algorithms and aggregation  
Even the more conventional forms of reputation-based decision making have undergone 
further change in light of Internet use and the availability of novel sources of data. A 
subject’s use of social media or indeed of sharing economy sites can, for instance, be 
used as a proxy for creditworthiness. An Australian scheme for alternative (and signifi-
cantly cheaper) deposits on rented properties, Trustbond, makes use of both types of 
                                                                                                                                               
wright, n 22 above, 655 (on the significance of financial regulator pressure on lenders to be assured of 
ability to repay, and of the relative cost of different approaches, on the working methods of lenders). 
63 Carruthers, n 14 above, 538. 
64 S. Ranchordás, ‘Online Reputation and the Regulation of Information Asymmetries in the Platform 
Economy’ (2018) 5 Critical Analysis of Law 127, 143. 
65 Jefferson County School District v Moody’s Investor’s Services 988 F Supp 1341 (District Court, CO 
1997) (‘The bond market depends in large measure upon the free, open exchange of information concern-
ing bond issues and the First Amendment is ultimately the best guarantor of the integrity of the bond rat-
ing system’); Browne v Avvo 525 F Supp 2d 1249, 1252 (District Court, Southern District NY 2007) 
(lawyer rating website); Castle Rock Remodeling v Better Business Bureau 354 SW 3d 234, 242-243 (MO 
Court of Appeal 2011) (rating of service providers by bureau on six-point scale). 
66 For the former: Lauer, n 15 above, 42 (defamation in general) and 68 (historic, though now discontin-
ued, practice of communicating sensitive information verbally and in restrictive circumstances). For the 
latter: Seaton v TripAdvisor (2013) 728 F 3d 592; Clark v TripAdvisor [2014] CSIH 110; Burki v 70/30 
Ltd [2018] EWHC 2151 (QB); the broader question of host liability for content posted by users (‘inter-
mediary liability’) is also relevant here (and differs as between the general immunity in the US and the 
conditional exclusions more commonly found elsewhere, including the UK). 
67 Pasquale, n 18 above, 140; J. Turow, The Aisles Have Eyes: How Retailers Track Your Shopping, Strip 
your Privacy, and Define your Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017) 262; G. Krippner, ‘De-
mocracy Of Credit: Ownership and the Politics of Credit Access in Late Twentieth-Century’ (2017) 123 
American Journal of Sociology 1; Fair Credit Reporting Act 1970, 15 USC §1681; Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act 1974, 15 USC §1691. For data protection in the EU see text to notes 180-209, below. 
68 Text to notes 156-244, below. 
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data.69 A Singapore-based lender, Lenddo, claims to use ‘non-traditional data…to eco-
nomically empower the emerging middle class’, which includes various social media 
sources.70 A US firm, Tala, operates in developing nations in Africa and Asia, claiming 
to utilise up to 10,000 ‘data points’ such as social media and smartphone use, in order to 
create a new type of credit score to the advantage of lower-income customers.71 
There has been a good deal of experimentation in the digital finance sector in terms of 
identifying creditworthiness, especially in conjunction with expansion into less devel-
oped economies.72 However, as with more conventional forms of credit scoring, the 
emphasis is often upon correlation rather than causation and can therefore introduce un-
intended discrimination such as regarding race.73 Observation of patent applications and 
corporate announcements discloses that service providers in the social media sector, 
such as Facebook, may be preparing for their own role in relation to future financial 
service products and the use of social media data in this context.74 
In her work on algorithms and decision-making, O’Neal distinguishes between the 
‘relatively transparent’ and ‘regulated’ systems of credit scoring developed from the 
1960s in the United States75 and the ‘arbitrary, unaccountable, unregulated, and often 
unfair’ assessments made by lenders and others who use browsing data and other in-
sights alongside more conventional scores in making decisions.76 It is also the case that 
many reputational systems are context-specific to some extent; that is, it is one’s behav-
iour as a Uber driver that governs one’s ability to drive for Uber, and one’s financial 
history that affects further financial activity. On the other hand, Wei et al argue that us-
ing information from social media has the potential to ‘reduce lenders’ misgivings about 
engaging applicants with limited personal financial history’ and so improve, for some, 
access to finance.77 
                                                 
69 http://www.trustbond.com; see C. Yeates, ‘How your social media account could help you get a loan’ 
Sydney Morning Herald (30 December 2017) https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-
finance/how-your-social-media-account-could-help-you-get-a-loan-20171219-p4yxw0.html. 
70 http://www.lenddo.com; see discussion in T. Tan and T. Phan, ‘Social Media-Driven Credit Scoring: 
the Predictive Value of Social Structures’ [2016] 37th International Conference on Information Systems 
552; C. Hynes, ‘How Social Media Could Help The Unbanked Land A Loan’ Forbes.com (25 April 
2017) https://www.forbes.com/sites/chynes/2017/04/25/how-data-will-help-drive-universal-financial-
access/. 
71 C. Cheney, ‘How Alternative Credit Scoring Is Transforming Lending In The Developing World’ 
Devex (8 September 2016) https://www.devex.com/news/how-alternative-credit-scoring-is-transforming-
lending-in-the-developing-world-88487.  
72 A. Costa, A. Deb and M. Kubzansky, Big Data, Small Credit: The Digital Revolution and its Impact on 
Emerging Market Consumers (Omidyar Network, 2016) https://www.omidyar.com/spotlight/what-big-
data-small-credit.  
73 S. Lohr, ‘Creditworthy? Let’s Consider Capitalization’ New York Times (19 January 2015) A1; see 
further text to notes 187-194, below. 
74 Packin and Lev-Aretz, n 46 above, 344-345; as one analysis puts it, ‘Facebook could be the next FICO’ 
(referring to Fair Isaac & Co. scores used in the United States): V. Mayer-Schönberger and K. Cukier, Big 
Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work and Think (London: John Murray, 2013) 
92; more sceptically, A. Mukherjee, The Internet Trap: Five Costs of Living Online (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2018) 67 (‘imagine if Facebook were to combine their records with commercially avail-
able data from credit card companies, credit rating agencies, and census databases: they would have more 
information about us than our closest friends and family’). 
75 See notes 13-36 above and accompanying text. 
76 C. O’Neal, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democ-
racy (New York: Random House, 2016) 142-145. 
77 Y. Wei, P. Yildirim, C. Van den Bulte and C. Dellarocas, ‘Credit Scoring with Social Network Data’ 
(2016) 35 Marketing Science 234, 249. 
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Aggregation is perhaps the most significant promised development, though again it can 
be seen as an obvious stage in the development of an information infrastructure, as oc-
curred in relation to financial information in earlier decades. The exploration of the pre-
dictive value of credit scores (alone or in combination with consumer data) for non-
credit questions, such as health, has also been noted,78 as has the use of credit scores in 
dating services79 and in a wide range of other contexts, including ‘auto insurance as-
sessments, cell phone contracts, residential rentals and even hiring decisions’.80 In an 
optimistic account of the potential for the sharing economy published in 2010, Botsman 
and Rogers suggested that there would soon be ‘some form of network that aggregates 
your reputation capital across multiple forms of collaborative consumption’.81 Some 
services now emphasise the analysis of reputational information originally gathered for 
a single or more limited purpose. A leading player in this area, Traity (which was also a 
partner in the above-mentioned Trustbond scheme in Australia) explains its role as as-
sisting users to ‘gather … reputation from different data sources so that [they] can con-
trol it, own it, and leverage [it]’.82 Other projects have sought to provide cross-platform 
indications of influence; examples include Sociota (a paid service which seeks to meas-
ure ‘reach’ and ‘engagement’ of a presence on social media)83 and Klout (which at-
tempted to measure ‘social media influence’ across multiple platforms, and closed, in 
the face of significant issues under data protection law, in 2018).84  
As more work takes place in respect of aggregation, the argument that these single-
purpose reputational systems are limited in significance becomes less compelling. Ag-
gregated reputational information has, however, the potential to address some of the 
known issues with the reliance of platforms upon their own reputation systems. One 
such criticism is that single-site systems disadvantage new users without a reputational 
history on that platform85), and discourage ‘switching’ between services.86 It takes effort 
for users (providers and customers) of sharing economy and similar services to build 
reputation through, for instance, positive ratings, or to understand how reputation is 
handled within a service.87 This can be a disincentive to switching, owing to the need to 
rebuild reputation or one’s understanding of trust and risk after such a switch.88 Sepa-
rately, innovations in e-commerce and social media have included the use of social me-
dia logins for third party sites (which, subject to the appropriate terms and conditions 
                                                 
78 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, n 74 above, 56-57. 
79 eg http://creditscoredating.com; see O’Neal, n 76 above, 321. 
80 A. Rona-Tas, ‘The Off-Label Use of Consumer Credit Ratings’ (2017) 42 Historical Social Research 
52, 53. 
81 Botsman and Rogers, n 18 above, 219. 
82 http://www.traity.com; see Sundararajan, n 43 above, 98.  
83 https://sociota.net. 
84 A. Rao, N. Spasojevic, Z. Li and T. D’Souza, ‘Klout Score: Measuring Influence Across Multiple So-
cial Networks’ [2015] IEEE International Conference on Big Data 2282; J. Kelly, ‘Soon, Nobody Will 
Have Any Klout’ Financial Times (11 May 2018) 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/05/11/1526033813000/Soon--nobody-will-have-any-Klout/. 
85 On the need for a critical mass of active users, see P. Hausemer, ‘Exploratory study of consumer issues 
in online peer-to-peer platform markets’ (2017), 86-87, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=45245. 
86 V. Hatzopoulos, The Collaborative Economy and EU Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018) 197. 
87 OECD, ‘Protecting Customers in Peer-Platform Markets’ (2016) OECD Digital Economy Papers No. 
253, 15. 
88 K. Sipp, ‘Portable Reputation in the On-Demand Economy’ in T. Scholz and N. Schneider (eds), Ours 
To Hack and To Own: the Rise of Platform Cooperativism (New York: OR Books, 2016) 59-61; on the 
relationship between platform models, users, and data, see eg N. Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 2018) 95, 110. 
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and applicable laws, may provide direct access to further data or indirect access as a 
consequence of identification), the involvement of platforms in other fields (such as 
Snapchat’s interest in wearable technology and image recognition89) and the cross-
referencing of merchant or ecommerce data with records obtained from data brokers 
(including those who have historically assigned credit scores).90 
Developing a conceptual framework 
The previous sections have shown that there is a considerable range of approaches to 
rating systems, but that some common themes are emerging. Tables 1 and 2 of this sec-
tion develop a framework that enables us to compare such systems at the descriptive 
level. Thus, the aim is to identify a short (and inevitably non-exhaustive) list of general 
topics which can then also be used to facilitate the understanding of the Chinese Social 
Credit System, as discussed below.91 
Table 1: Degree of interventionism in rating systems 
 Low  Medium High 
1) Drafter Private Co-drafting State 
2) User Choice Strong incentive Mandatory 
3) Aim Specific Socio-economic General 
4) Scoring Multiple Main and sub-indicators Single 
5) Application Flexible Comply or explain Uniform 
6) Algorithm Transparency Controlled transparency Protected 
7) Enforcement Market Stages of enforcement State 
8) Accountability Oversight body Review possible Immunity 
 
Table 1 displays eight topics. The first two criteria relate to the drafter and user of the 
system: first, is it initiated and drafted by a private entity or state authority, and, second, 
is it mandatory for individuals (users) to participate in the system, or do they have 
choice? Thirdly, we ask whether the scheme has a single, specific aim, or a broader set 
of objectives across a number of functions or context. The fourth and fifth questions re-
late to the specific operation of the scheme: does it use multiple scores or a single score, 
and is a result indicative or definitive (e.g. a precise number)? The sixth and seventh 
criteria ask how transparent the scheme is, and the responsibility for enforcing it. Final-
ly, rating systems vary according to their degree of accountability, in particular how far 
a separate oversight body92 monitors the design and operation of the system. 
                                                 
89 See eg B. Gallagher, How To Turn Down A Billion Dollars: The Snapchat Story (New York: St Mar-
tin’s Press, 2018) 230, 247-251; S. Liao, ‘Snapchat is working on a feature that can find products you 
snap on Amazon’ The Verge (9 July 2018) https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/9/17549372/snapchat-
feature-find-amazon-products-google-lens; A. Pardes, ‘Why Snap needs its spectacles’ Wired (May 2018) 
https://www.wired.com/story/why-snap-needs-its-spectacles/.  
90 Turow, n 67 above, 155-157. 
91 See Table 3, below. Given this descriptive function, these criteria should not be seen as a normative 
benchmark; for policy considerations see discussion in text to notes 179-244, below. 
92 eg the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority monitors the credit scoring operated by private companies. 
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With these criteria, Table 1 also conceptualises how a rating system can have a low, 
medium or high degree of interventionism, which to some extent relates to the involve-
ment of the state but also incorporates other substantive and procedural issues. For ex-
ample, it can be seen that a system drafted by a private entity on a specific issue that is 
flexible in its application is at the lower end of interventionism, while a comprehensive 
system drafted and enforced by a public authority is more interventionist. The table also 
indicates that intermediate models are possible, for example, as far as rating systems are 
co-drafted or applied with a ‘comply or explain’ mechanism.  
 Table 2: Interventionism in selected rating systems 
 Credit ratings in 
many countries 
 UK research excel-
lence framework 
Sharing economy 
platforms 
1) Drafter Low High Low 
2) User Medium Medium Low 
3) Aim Low/Medium Low Low 
4) Scoring Medium Medium Medium/High 
5) Application Medium/High High High 
6) Algorithm Medium Medium Low/Medium 
7) Enforcement Low Medium Low 
8) Accountability Low Low Medium 
 
Table 2 shows that this model can be further explained by applying it to a number of the 
schemes discussed above. For instance, sharing economy and other peer-to-peer plat-
forms often use their own reputation system, with a specific aim of supporting transac-
tions on that platform, and enforced by the market that the platform has instigated. Ap-
plying the system is relatively inflexible, though; as discussed above, an Uber driver’s 
entitlement to use the platform will be affected by her rating. It should also be noted that 
some observations are tentative, in the absence of full disclosure by private parties as to 
how their systems operate93 – a point which we will return to below. 
Overall, it can be seen that these rating systems combine different elements of low, me-
dium and high interventionism. It is also noteworthy that none of these ratings have a 
high degree of interventionism in the fields ‘user’, ‘aim’, ‘algorithm’, ‘enforcement’ and 
‘accountability’: this is potentially different in the emerging Chinese system as it is said 
to shift from ‘reputation society’ to the ‘reputation state’94 and thus to a more formal-
ised model where reputation matters not only through societal forces (or as a self-
contained aid to the use of a particular service) but as a tool of decision-making. Yet, 
the Chinese model also contains a number of nuances, to which we turn now. 
                                                 
93 For example, while it can be assumed that a displayed rating is the mean of submitted scores (with or 
without explanatory comments or sub-scores), a service provider can choose to apply a weighting system 
which, for instance, controls for timeliness or the reliability of the person providing the rating: see further 
L. Pettersen, ‘Rating Mechanisms Among Participants in Sharing Economy Platforms’ (2017) 22(12) 
First Monday DOI: 10.5210/fm.v22i12.7908 . 
94 X. Dai, ‘Toward a Reputation State: The Social Credit System Project of China’ Working Paper (10 
June 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193577.  
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CHINA: SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM AND REPUTATION RATINGS 
Preliminary considerations 
The websites mentioned in the previous part are rarely used in mainland China: Airbnb 
is available; yet, eBay and Uber have been unsuccessful in entering the Chinese market 
and many social media sites are blocked (e.g., Twitter and Facebook).95 Thus, Chinese 
citizens rely on the specific Chinese providers, which also implies that the Chinese gov-
ernment may in principle be able to get access to the corresponding user data. 
The previous part also discussed the use of financial credit rating systems in Europe and 
North America. The People’s Bank of China (ie the Chinese central bank) has estab-
lished the Credit Reference Centre96 which provides both commercial and consumer 
credit reporting, based on credit information made available by banks and state institu-
tions (e.g., regarding social welfare payments). The resulting reports are important for 
anyone who applies for a bank loan. Yet, these reports do not provide an actual rating of 
the creditworthiness of businesses and consumers, though this may change in the future 
due to the developments discussed in this part. 
The Chinese Social Credit System has received extensive coverage in the Western 
press, where it is often described as a big-data-driven comprehensive rating of all Chi-
nese citizens.97 However, this is a misleading characterisation of the current situation. 
At present, three different models operate: China-wide blacklists, compliance scores by 
pilot cities, and social credit scores by financial institutions. The three main sections of 
this part will explain these forms of social control. Subsequently, this part will reflect on 
future developments and relate those to Western comments made about the Chinese 
model. 
The Social Credit System and the use of China-wide blacklists 
The introduction of the Social Credit System by the central government has a potential-
ly far-reaching effect; yet, the China-wide measures that implement it are, so far, rather 
specific – namely, using blacklists – as this section explains. 
The Social Credit System aims to address not only the financial creditworthiness of in-
dividuals and companies but also their sincerity, honesty, and integrity.98 The initial dis-
cussions of the early 2000s put this in the context of the objective of supporting the 
transition to a market economy after China’s accession to the WTO, for example, the 
need to combat commercial fraud and IP infringements.99 A 2011 decision then also re-
                                                 
95 L. Yuan, ‘A Generation Grows Up in China Without Google, Facebook Or Twitter’ New York Times (7 
August 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/06/technology/china-generation-blocked-internet.html. 
Some other countries seem to follow, see ‘Beijing Wants to Rewrite the Rules of the Internet’ The Atlan-
tic (18 June 2018) https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/zte-huawei-china-trump-
trade-cyber/563033/.  
96 See http://www.pbccrc.org.cn/crc/ (available in English) and https://ipcrs.pbccrc.org.cn with access to 
the information (available in Chinese only). 
97 See text to notes 139-155, below. 
98 See R. Creemers, ‘China’s Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control’ Working Paper (9 
May 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3175792, noting in footnote 13 that the Mandarin term 
for ‘credit’ (xinyong) cognates with terms for ‘sincerity, honesty, and integrity’; similar Dai, n 94 above, 
16 (also on the use of the word ‘social’). 
99 See M. Chorzempa, P. Triolo and S. Sacks, ‘China’s Social Credit System: A Mark of Progress or a 
Threat to Privacy?’, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 18-14 (June 2018) 3; 
Creemers, n 98 above, 3. 
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ferred to ‘matters of social and political morality’ as points of concern.100 In 2014 this 
was followed by the State Council’s ‘Notice concerning Issuance of the Planning Out-
line for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)’,101 which forms the 
basis of the development of the Social Credit System today. This document mentions 
the aim to promote ‘integrity in government affairs’, ‘commercial sincerity’, ‘social in-
tegrity’ and ‘judicial public trust’ which shows that these measures are targeted at indi-
viduals (the focus of this article), as well as companies, judicial organs, and other gov-
ernmental authorities. It also explains that the ultimate goal is a uniform social credit 
system based on penalty and award mechanisms, presenting this idea in a general sense, 
with no references to quantitative measures and the collection of online data.102 
The specific penalty mechanisms that are already operational aim to enforce the black-
lists of persons who have violated the law. They are implemented and enforced by dif-
ferent government authorities. The process started with a decision of the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court on public blacklists of persons who defied legally binding judgments,103 but 
there are now also many further blacklists compiled by other authorities, for example, 
the Ministry of Culture and Tourism lists those who have violated transport rules, such 
as smoking or carrying prohibited items.104 Subsequently, a degree of centralisation has 
taken place. A central website makes the names of the blacklisted persons publicly 
available.105 There is also now a system in place that requires cooperation of authorities 
in their sanctions (the Joint Punishment System).106 This means that a violation of the 
law can lead to a variety of sanctions; it may start with a fine, but the perpetrator may 
subsequently be banned from flying or using high speed trains. It is also possible that 
these blacklists have implications for private-law relationships: while Chinese business-
persons may merely care about their own profits (and therefore be willing to do busi-
ness with everyone), the recognition of blacklists by financial institutions can mean that 
blacklisted persons may not be able to use the funds on their current accounts in order to 
purchase a car or other luxury items.107 
Given the severe consequences of these blacklists, it is provided that individuals need to 
be notified in advance. There are also some internal review proceedings: for example, 
                                                 
100 Central Committee, 18 October 2011 as translated at 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2011/10/18/central-committee-of-the-chinesecommunist-
party-decision-concerning-deepening-cultural-structural-reform/.  
101 English translation available at https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-
outline-for-the-construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/. 
102 As also noted by Creemers, n 98 above, 13. 
103 Interpretation No. 17 [2013] of the Supreme People’s Court, English translation available at 
www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=207020&EncodingName=gb2312. Search func-
tions are available at http://zxgk.court.gov.cn/. 
104 See eg https://www.whatsonweibo.com/20-chinese-tourists-travel-blacklist/ and 
https://jingtravel.com/china-bans-169-people-from-travel-with-new-blacklist/. 
105 See Credit China, www.creditchina.gov.cn/ and, for companies, the National Enterprise Credit Infor-
mation Publicity System, www.gsxt.gov.cn/. For empirical research on these blacklists (as well as the 
corresponding ‘redlists’ for good behaviour) see S. Engelmann et al, ‘Clear Sanctions, Vague Rewards: 
How China’s Social Credit System Currently Defines “Good” and “Bad” Behavior’ (2019) Proceedings 
of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency 69. 
106 State Council Guiding Opinions concerning Establishing and Perfecting Incentives for Promise-
keeping and Joint Punishment Systems for Trust-Breaking, and Accelerating the Construction of Social 
Sincerity, English translation available at https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2016/05/30/-
state-council-guiding-opinions-concerning-establishing-and-perfecting-incentives-for-promise-keeping-
and-joint-punishment-systems-for-trust-breaking-and-accelerating-the-construction-of-social-sincer/.  
107 For the latter point see also text to notes 117-125, below. 
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the State Administration of Taxation, which has its own system of blacklists, has a 
‘credit repair mechanism’ that provides correction of or relief from the blacklist under 
certain conditions.108 Moreover, in principle, there is also a right to appeal to the courts, 
although observers have been sceptical as to how far these legal safeguards are effec-
tive.109 
Pilot cities issuing compliance scores 
In addition to the China-wide implementation of the Social Credit System, the Chinese 
government has authorised over forty pilot cities to experiment with forms of social 
credit. The following will provide some representative examples. These local schemes 
also have to be seen in the wider context of the ways that Chinese regions and cities 
have developed elaborated tools of state surveillance and supervision. For example, in 
the provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet, there are particularly extensive monitoring of in-
ternet use as well as elaborate registration and ID card requirements.110 More generally, 
CCTV cameras see widespread use in China, including forms of public shaming (e.g., 
publicly listing jaywalkers caught by facial recognition cameras in Shenzhen).111  
Two of the most extensive examples of regional pilots are from Suining in Jiangsu and 
Rongcheng in Shandong province. In both of these pilots, each citizen started with 1000 
points. They could then lose points for a variety of infringements, such as traffic light 
violations, drunk driving, or having a child without the necessary administrative permis-
sion, but they could also re-gain points by ‘good’ actions, such as caring for elderly 
family members. The resulting points were then translated into a rating from A to D 
which could influence the individual in a positive or negative way in their dealing with 
the local government. For example, someone with a high rating would get preferential 
access to government subsidies, while someone with a low rating would be restricted in 
applications for housing, social welfare, business licenses, and public procurement.112 
There are also forms of public shaming and appraisal, for example, as billboards in 
some of the main squares display the names and pictures of citizens who have recently 
won or lost social credit points, and the city of Rongcheng makes some of this data 
available via a website.113 
Other pilot cities have comparable schemes. All of these are underpinned by provincial 
and municipal pieces of legislation. Some of those rules have been translated into Eng-
lish,114 and it is fairly straight-forward to understand their main aims and limitations. 
For example, the 56 articles of the Shanghai Social Credit Regulations 2017 are struc-
tured according to the headings (i) General provisions, (ii) Social credit information, 
                                                 
108 See eg www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n2367751/c3633676/content.html.  
109 Creemers, n 98 above, 19. For judicial review in China see also text to notes 206-209, below.  
110 See eg ‘Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China’s Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life’ Wall 
Street Journal (19 December 2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas-
surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life-1513700355. 
111 See eg ‘Inside China’s surveillance state’ FT Magazine (20 July 2018); Creemers, n 98 above, 18 (for 
the jaywalking example). 
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2019) https://www.thenation.com/article/china-social-credit-system/; ‘Life Inside China’s Social Credit 
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(iii) Credit incentives and restrictions, (iv) Protection of information subjects’ rights and 
interests, (v) Regulating and advancing the development of the credit services industry, 
(vi) The establishment of a social credit environment, (vii) Legal responsibility, and 
(viii) Supplemental provisions, with a noticeable desire to provide legal certainty to an-
yone affected by the Social Credit System. However, this is apparently also done in a 
way that does not limit the possible actions of the state authorities, as wide general 
sanctions such as ‘restrict entry into relevant markets and industries’ and ‘restrict en-
joyment of relevant public policies’ show.115  
Shanghai is also a good example of the use of incentives through the so-called Honest 
Shanghai scheme. Honest Shanghai is a voluntary smartphone app that asks users to en-
ter their state ID number and then returns a rating as ‘very good’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’. This 
rating is apparently based on data the Shanghai government has collected about each 
citizen; details of the algorithm are however not transparent.116 This use of incentives 
and algorithms can also be seen in the next category, namely the social credit scores de-
veloped by financial institutions. 
Financial institutions providing social credit scores 
Financial institutions have also been allowed to create schemes implementing the Social 
Credit System. Many of these pilots consider a wide range of information, including 
social network data. Thus, here in particular, it may be justified to talk about schemes 
measuring ‘social credit’ (and not simply questions of ‘financial credit’). 
The most influential of these schemes has been Sesame Credit (also spelled Zhima 
Credit in English), developed by Alibaba’s subsidiary Ant Financial Group.117 It evalu-
ates the creditworthiness of firms and individuals with a model of ‘smart business’ 
which captures information automatically and then evaluates it with algorithmic tools in 
real time.118 In detail, Sesame Credit scores each user on a scale of 350 to 950 points, 
based on five sets of information: (i) financial credit records, (ii) behavioural trends in 
commercial transactions, (iii) available assets and personal information, (iv) behaviour 
and preferences and (v) social relationships. As Sesame Credit is a smartphone app, 
linked to Alibaba’s mobile payment system Alipay, it is clear that it accesses the phones 
of its users for information gathering.  
However, beyond this general information, it is not transparent which tools and algo-
rithms are used. In particular, this applies to the broad categories (iv) and (v) where ru-
mours are that factors are considered such as: excessively playing video games, cheat-
ing in online video games, and a frequent change of address (negative) and donations to 
charity, having friends with high Sesame Credit ratings, and polite behaviour on social 
media (positive).119 This potential use of a wide range of information can also be seen in 
other examples. For instance, the company Tencent (alongside the above-mentioned 
                                                 
115 Art 31 of the Shanghai Social Credit Regulations 2017. 
116 See M. Ohlberg, S. Ahmed and B. Lang, ‘Central Planning, Local Experiments: The complex imple-
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117 See https://www.xin.xin/ (in Chinese). 
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June 2018) http://www.wired.co.uk/article/china-social-credit. 
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Alibaba and Baidu, seen as the trio of most powerful Chinese technology companies) is 
not only the developer of the social media app WeChat, installed by a billion users, but 
has also been one of the companies involved in the development of a social credit sys-
tem. Thus, naturally, all information accumulated via the WeChat app may be used for 
ratings of its WeChat Pay Score; yet, details remain undisclosed.120 
The consequences of a high Sesame Credit rating are far-reaching. To start with, as this 
rating is provided by a financial institution, users with higher scores have better access 
to easy forms of credit. In addition, many other companies also consider the Sesame 
Credit rating through an agreement with Alibaba: for example, a high rating may mean 
that such users do not need to pay a deposit for renting a flat, a car or a bicycle,121 get 
faster check-in at hotels and airlines, and are displayed more prominently on dating 
websites (and users may also disclose a high score as a status symbol elsewhere, which 
apparently many do). The Chinese state is also not completely unconnected to the Ses-
ame Credit rating and Alipay. On the one hand, for example, a high rating can make it 
easier to secure priority access in hospitals or a visa for overseas travel. On the other 
hand, Alibaba forwards non-compliance of payment obligations to the government, 
while also contributing to the implementation of China-wide blacklists through blocking 
certain transactions using Alipay.122  
In early 2018, however, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) decided to withhold a re-
newal of the licences for these private social credit scores. There is some speculation 
about the reasons for this decision, for example, that Alibaba and others may have got 
too powerful, that they have stated collecting too much personal and social information 
about their users, and that they may face conflicts of interest as they also benefit com-
mercially from their customers.123 It also seems that the PBOC now believes that it is a 
good time to design a new consolidated credit rating – called Baihang Credit score – to 
be developed by a public-private partnership between the PBOC and eight private fi-
nancial institutions.124 
Some financial institutions have started sharing credit data with the Baihang Credit sys-
tem.125 However, further details are not yet clear. For example, it seems that Sesame and 
other ratings may continue for non-credit purposes, such as the bike rentals, visa ap-
provals and dating websites mentioned above. It is also too early to say whether the new 
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Internet 415. 
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Baihang Credit score will be more focussed on financial credit, as the PBOC’s in-
volvement in the Credit Reference Centre126 may indicate, or whether it will incorporate 
the wide ‘social credit’ approach of Sesame Credit and other commercial ratings.  
Future perspectives and reception in China 
The previous sections have shown that it would be premature to talk about ‘the’ Social 
Credit System in China. Rather there are three different systems at the moment (with 
further sub-groupings possible) which follow somehow different logics. Table 3 maps 
those systems based on the distinction between high, medium, and low interventionist 
models, explained earlier in this article.127 
Table 3: Degree of interventionism in the Social Credit System (so far) 
 China-wide 
blacklists 
Pilot cities Financial institu-
tions 
1) Drafter High High Low 
2) User High High Medium 
3) Aim Low Low High 
4) Scoring Low High High 
5) Application High Medium Medium 
6) Algorithm Low High High 
7) Enforcement High Medium Low 
8) Accountability High Low Low 
 
It can be seen that all three existing systems have only some elements of a highly inter-
ventionist model: the China-wide blacklists due to the state influence in drafting, en-
forcement and lack of accountability (leading to a high degree of interventionism) as 
well as their mandatory and uniform application; the scores developed by pilot cities 
due to their belonging to the state, as well as their mandatory nature, single scoring 
mechanisms and protected algorithms; and the ratings by financial institutions due to 
their relatively general scope (often going well beyond financial credit information) as 
well as their single scoring mechanisms and protected algorithms. 
This complex status quo raises the question whether the different elements will soon be 
consolidated into a ‘state-run meta social-credit system’?128 So, in the framework of the 
three models, will the future be a full interventionist system in all eight categories?  
Such further evolution would assume that the current experience with the Social Credit 
System is a largely positive one. Two recent empirical studies find some evidence that 
this is indeed the case (though it may be doubtful how far respondents dare to provide 
                                                 
126 See text to note 96, above. 
127 See text to notes 91-94, above. 
128 L.C. Backer, ‘Measurement, Assessment and Reward: The Challenges of Building Institutionalized 
Social Credit and Rating Systems in China and in the West’ (Proceedings of the Chinese Social Credit 
System, Shanghai Jaiotong University, 23 September 2017) 7, available at 
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fully open answers).129 The Chinese media mentions the way the Social Credit System 
can create a ‘culture of integrity’, solve economic problems and improve governance.130 
More specifically, reports in Chinese newspapers most frequently emphasise its benefit 
for commerce and rural welfare. In particular, the argument is here that this system ena-
bles honest but poor persons (including small businesses) to obtain financial credit 
which otherwise would not be available.131 With respect to the Sesame Credit score, it is 
also said that it may give citizens more control over the impact of their actions than pre-
viously,132 and that the ‘gamification’ of the Sesame Credit score as a reward system 
may be one of its practical advantages.133 And even the blacklisting system can be seen 
as beneficial for individuals as far as it induces their debtors (e.g., contractual counter-
parties) to comply with court judgments.134 
There has also been some public criticism of the emerging ratings in China – reflecting 
the well-established interest in privacy (or the related concept of reputation) across soci-
eties,135 despite differences in legal and human rights protection. As regards the pilot 
cities, the Suining experiment was criticised by the official state media comparing it 
with the system of Good Citizen Cards used by the Japanese during the occupation of 
China during the Second World War.136 Similarly, an academic from the Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences argues that social credit should not cover any violation of 
moral behaviour, but that it needs to be defined in a narrow way as failure of compli-
ance with legal and contractual obligations.137 There have also been discussions in Chi-
nese media about problems of information security, data privacy and flaws in the tech-
nical design, in particular with respect to the ratings by financial institutions.138 Yet, of 
course, applying a comparative ‘Western’ perspective, the assessment may even be 
more critical, as will be seen in the next section.  
The Social Credit System and ‘Western values’ 
Most Western commentators resolutely reject the Chinese Social Credit System. The 
words frequently used are that it is a ‘tool for totalitarian surveillance’,139 an invention 
                                                 
129 See eg G. Kostka, ‘China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of Ap-
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139 Ohlberg et al, n 116 above, 12. 
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of ‘the digital totalitarian state’,140 that it is ‘worse than an Orwellian nightmare’,141 a 
meeting of ‘big data’ with ‘Big Brother’,142 or indeed a meeting of Orwell’s 1984 with 
Pavlov’s dogs: ‘act like a good citizen, be rewarded and be made to think you’re having 
fun’.143 However, understanding the Social Credit System as ‘merely’ a tool of state 
surveillance144 misunderstands the diversity of the current system, in terms of manage-
ment but more importantly in terms of functions, as outlined in the previous sections. 
Still, as a more moderate form of criticism, we may also identify problems such as the 
confusion between conflicting objectives (and corresponding problems of construct va-
lidity), problems of data reliability (in particular as regards the measurement of soft fac-
tors) and the risks of a monopolist system lacking competition (with corresponding risks 
of corruption).145 
Another frequent reaction is that the Chinese Social Credit System is incompatible with 
Western political and cultural values. For example, it has been suggested that it may be 
suitable for an authoritarian political system, but not a liberal democracy: only the for-
mer system can be openly paternalistic, as inherent in the Social Credit System,146 and it 
may also be linked to other forms of control of personal behaviour used by the Chinese 
government, and associated with a Leninist idea of ‘social management processes’, such 
as the records about the performance and attitudes of citizens (dang’an) and the house-
hold registration system (hukou).147 Another factor may be that there is widespread 
scepticism how far China has embraced the rule of law;148 thus, as far as this is doubted, 
it can be said that the Social Credit System would be problematic in the rule-of-law so-
cieties of the West as it lacks transparency, as it disrespects the divide between law and 
politics,149 and as it is not needed due to more effective law enforcement anyway.150  
Cultural differences may also be relevant. As some of the mechanisms of the Social 
Credit System use forms of ‘shaming’, it may matter that in China shame is said to be 
an effective means of social control due to the desire to maintain harmony in relation-
                                                 
140 ‘China invents the digital totalitarian state’ The Economist (17 December 2016) 
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ships, as opposed to the rights focus of Western countries.151 As Western societies have 
lower thresholds as regards the feeling of ‘intrusion’,152 and as in China there is lower 
trust towards strangers (with corresponding higher trust in close networks of guanxi), a 
trust-building instrument such as the Social Credit System also seems to fit better with 
Chinese culture.153 This may also be seen in existing legal rules: the concern regarding 
data collection by states (or the use by states of data collected by others) highlighted in 
20th century abuses, has long informed the development of robust data protection legis-
lation in the West, especially in the European Union,154 whereas data protection and 
privacy legislation in China is fragmentary at best.155  
However, this critical perspective should not be our final word on the comparative as-
sessment of the Social Credit System. The following will therefore discuss how far, de-
spite this criticism and despite these differences, something can be gained from compar-
ing the model of Social Credit System with its Western counterparts.  
COMPARISON, EVALUATION AND REGULATION 
Should we compare? 
Some argue that, for scholars from Western countries, Chinese law remains a ‘mystery’ 
that they cannot apprehend – and that any sense of understanding may be a mere illu-
sion that tells us more about the Western legal culture than about the Chinese one.156 
Thus, at least, authors from the West ought to be cautious in the way they can assess 
Chinese law. However, China has also transplanted a large number of legal concepts 
from Western countries in recent years.157 Thus, it can also be noted that contemporary 
Chinese law may, in many respects, not be fundamentally different from its Western 
counterpart, and that in both China and the West we have to understand how legal rules 
coevolve with political, social, economic and cultural factors in order to understand how 
‘law works’.158 
For rating systems, a similar dialectic line of reasoning can be applied. On the one hand, 
as we have seen, the rating systems developed in the West have limits in their ‘interven-
tionism’159 and might be seen as (largely) optional activities from which users can with-
draw, while it is possible that in China a fully ‘interventionist’ system will be imple-
mented in the near future.160 Thus, it seems that, in comparison, this ‘unification of the 
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various elements, and their seamless operation would be a great innovation’,161 or in any 
case ‘unique’ as compared to anything that is happening in the West.162  
On the other hand, this should not lead to the conclusion that the Social Credit System 
and its Western counterparts are incommensurable. Some of the aspects of the Chinese 
system are not part of the Western rating systems; yet, they are not completely alien to 
the West. For example, it was explained that, as part of the Social Credit System, China 
uses blacklists of persons who have violated the law in order to exclude them with the 
help of data sharing from many aspects of social life.163 Chorzempa et al relate this to 
the use of background checks and ‘no-fly lists’ in the US;164 in Israel, codes (based on 
various data) are assigned to passengers as part of a distinctive ‘risk-based’ security sys-
tem.165 In many countries, criminal records and details of insolvent debtors are collected 
and may be shared more or less widely in a number of European states.166 Other in-
stances include the system of control of football spectators in the UK (‘football banning 
orders’), which includes the temporary holding of passports during relevant periods (in-
ternational fixtures) to prevent travel,167 and the growing use of ‘penalty points’ systems 
in road traffic law,168 which can in turn be used as an indication of the ‘reputation’ of 
the data subject,169 even by car hire companies when deciding whether to rent to a driv-
er.170 Even in respect of private sector services (eg in the sharing economy), a poor rep-
utation can exclude individuals from these emerging markets, with consequences for 
their financial position and their participation in certain aspects of urban life. 
It can also be shown that the design and regulation of today’s rating systems are already 
clear examples of policy diffusion.171 The Chinese system partly derives from its West-
ern counterparts: the financial credit scoring systems of Western countries have been an 
explicit source of influence,172 and more recent tools such as the Sesame Credit scores 
may be seen as an example of the ‘gamification’ of rating systems in recent times.173 As 
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these systems develop, we see some attempts made to emphasise how users are granted 
agency and can utilise the data in varying ways. In return, the growing global influence 
of China174 can mean that the Social Credit System may well be a regulatory tool which 
could inspire the West: the Social Credit System may show that China now ‘appears to 
have ascended to the position of principal global driving force in political theory and 
action’,175 with ‘the potential to change law and government as we know them in China 
and beyond’.176 And while Pasquale highlights the shift towards a ‘scored society’ be-
yond the narrower functions of the 19th and 20th century, recent developments in China 
suggest, as noted above, a shift from ‘reputation society’ to ‘reputation state’.177 
Thus, the question arises how such a future development should be assessed: in other 
words, if reputation and rating systems consolidate in Western markets in a similar fash-
ion, what opportunities and controversies will arise – and how should law makers inter-
vene? How is what Rule calls the ‘seductive appeal of mass surveillance’ which be-
comes feasible following technological advances to be addressed alongside a greater 
understanding of dangers?178 Will rating systems have different impacts on different 
groups of people, especially if there is a shift away from opt-in systems (where there 
may be incentives for participation) to systems that are (perhaps de facto if not yet de 
jure) universal? 
A simplified normative framework 
Evaluating rating systems is complex as much will depend on their precise substance 
and context. Thus, it could be suggested that mutual learning between such systems is 
likely to work best if they are based on a broadly similar design.  It may also be helpful 
to move away from generalised criticisms or concerns towards a more precise identifi-
cation of shortcomings of particular implementations. In addition, it is worth consider-
ing how far the reasons for and against systems with very different designs may stimu-
late mutual learning. Here, at the level of some generality, it is possible to identify pos-
sible shortcomings of systems that are either based on a low or a high level of interven-
tion (or to put it in another way, the advantages of either of those systems), following 
the categories developed earlier in this article.179 
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Table 4: Typical shortcomings of low and high interventionist rating systems 
 Low  High 
1) Drafter Private drafters may disre-
gard public interest, with 
limited opportunities for 
oversight 
State’s monopoly may be 
abused, with limited checks 
and balances including through 
competition 
2) User Giving users choice enables 
them to enter and exit the 
system in a strategic way 
Mandatory system may disre-
gard interests of users and be-
come unresponsive 
3) Aim Specific systems may be 
biased towards narrow in-
terests 
General systems may lead to 
disproportionate control of be-
haviour, or violate data protec-
tion concepts such as purpose 
limitation 
4) Scoring Multiple scores may lead to 
conflicting incentives 
Single score may disregard 
complexities of social reality 
5) Application Flexible use may open door 
to corruption and biases  
Uniform application may ne-
glect fairness of individual case 
6) Algorithm Transparency may harm op-
eration through game-
playing 
Protected algorithm may disre-
gard need for accountability  
7) Enforcement Markets may lack effective 
means of enforcement 
State may respond with overly 
harsh and rigid sanctions  
8) Accountability Constant interventions by 
oversight body may harm 
the operation of system 
System which cannot be chal-
lenged may lead to the prolif-
eration of biases  
 
As the overview in Table 4 illustrates, a priori, it does not seem justified to regard either 
a low or a high interventionist system as superior. Indeed, it can be seen that in many 
circumstances the advantages of one of the systems are the disadvantages of the other 
one, and vice versa. For example, when a high interventionist system is inflexible, it 
may also be said that it is effective; and when a low interventionist system is biased to-
wards narrow interests, a high interventionist system may be overly diffuse.  
Thus, a possible response could be that a medium level of interventionism (as included 
in Tables 1 to 3, above) may be a good compromise. Notably, it may follow that a ‘sof-
tening’ of the highly interventionist approach of the Chinese Social Credit System with 
tools developed elsewhere may achieve the ‘best of both worlds’. It is therefore worth 
examining how far legal and regulatory tools from the West (but possibly also else-
where) can address some of the shortfalls of rating systems but also retain their benefits. 
In the next sections, we therefore review some of the current debates regarding regula-
tion, before returning to the Chinese system, now considered as a part of global trends. 
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The complexities of regulating ratings 
The Chinese Social Credit System has been accompanied by a large volume of legisla-
tion and other policy documents: for example, a recent article lists 15 pages of docu-
ments produced by the central government and other public authorities,180 and there are 
also many provincial and municipal pieces of legislation.181 The majority of those rules 
are about the technical operation of the Social Credit System, which is not the main fo-
cus of this article. Thus, before returning to aspects of the current Chinese law at the end 
of this section, we start with the way some of the more general policy considerations 
have been addressed in Europe and elsewhere in the West. We identify here the benefits 
of data (for consumer protection and law enforcement), and then outline certain con-
cerns regarding the possibility of discrimination and the protection of privacy. 
Law enforcement authorities have long recognised the valuable role played by records 
gathered in the private sector: consumer credit agencies in the US often provided co-
operation,182 and present day intelligence and policing functions make use of data col-
lected for private sector Internet purposes (whether for an Internet connection or an 
online service)183 or obtain it through interception,184 all of which typically goes beyond 
what a state can gather through its own resources.185 Less controversially, rating and 
review systems are pointed to (eg by the European Commission)  as an important safe-
guard for sharing or collaborative economy platforms, especially in the absence of the 
relevant information or, in some circumstances, the inapplicability of consumer protec-
tion rules.186 
The extent to which the reliance upon rating and reputation may have a disparate impact 
on some groups and constitute a form of (albeit possibly unintended) discrimination,187 
and how ‘neutral’ systems, even where there is no evidence of consumer discrimination, 
can still produce unequal outcomes on vectors such as gender pay,188 has been high-
lighted. Although the specific area of credit benefits from explicit prohibitions on the 
use of certain data, even this area sees the use of alternative data sources that may aid in 
discrimination in practice.189 Some argue, however, that reputation-led approaches 
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could still displace existing discrimination,190 or flag an open question as to whether 
algorithmic approaches could make hidden discrimination visible and create further 
problems of discrimination anew.191 A recent decision of an equality tribunal in Finland 
highlighted how automated decisions made by credit entities through statistical profiling 
can violate anti-discrimination provisions of national law.192 Both data collected from 
users (possibly including browsing history)193 and credit records194 can be used as an aid 
to price differentiation, which is also controversial (and has the potential for disparate 
impact). 
Although the most extreme abuses of reputational information, such as the compiling 
and use of a ‘blacklist’ of workers on the grounds of their trade union activity, raise ob-
vious human rights issues,195 data protection law has a clear impact across a much 
broader range of systems. The 2018 coming into force in the European Union of an ex-
tensive General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),196 building upon what was first 
promulgated in individual states and then through a Council of Europe Convention197 
and EU Directive,198 provides a partial framework for the regulation of rating and repu-
tational data.  
Data protection laws provide further detail on the conditions under which the processing 
of personal data is lawful. Such rules may begin to provide a framework where prob-
lems of validity and reliability, which have been the subject of warnings both in the 
West and in China,199 can be addressed. Data protection concerns were also at the core 
of the criticism of services like Peeple, a proposed service that would have allowed in-
dividuals to ‘rate’ others whether they used the service or not. Thus, it was subsequently 
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launched as a more limited service in light of such concerns,200 though somewhat simi-
lar projects are also being developed by others, especially regarding online dating.201 
One constraint upon rating systems is the need to ensure that data can be updated and 
challenged in light of its accuracy (article 5(1)(d) GDPR). Automatic deletion of nega-
tive information after a set period has been a feature of some credit recording sys-
tems,202 and the famed challenge to Google’s indexing of an old news report on the 
forced sale of property on foot of an unpaid debt succeeded on the basis of data protec-
tion law203 even before it was strengthened in the GDPR in the more explicit right to 
erasure (article 17 GDPR).  
Further attention is also likely to be paid to the rights set out in article 22 GDPR – not 
(in some circumstances) to be subject to a decision with legal or similar effects based 
solely on automated processing,204 and the possibility, in other circumstances where au-
tomated decision-making is lawful, to receive an explanation and an opportunity to 
challenge.205 Nonetheless, there will continue to be situations (expressly provided for in 
GDPR) where consent is not required (as other legal bases are available), which sup-
ports the development of powerful, potentially universal systems – although the right to 
object to processing carried out under certain (non-consent) legal bases, under article 21 
GDPR, could constrain the development of such systems. 
Although influenced by earlier Western laws,206 Chinese law on privacy and data pro-
tection remains fragmented and drafted in reaction to specific problems rather than as an 
overarching framework;207 this ‘sectoral’ approach is also a feature of US law, as com-
pared with the general approach in the EU. In China, the relevance of access and correc-
tion rights under privacy and data protection law is said to be affected by the limitations 
on actions against public authorities in Chinese law.208 Even as far as judicial review of 
public authorities is feasible, the issue remains how far Chinese courts can be said to be 
independent enough in deciding cases that involve the state on the one side and private 
parties on the other.209 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss this general issue 
about courts in China in detail – and, to the best of our knowledge, there have not yet 
been any judicial challenges in matters concerning the Social Credit System in China. 
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From a policy perspective, however, we suggest that judicial review should be provided 
as a way of protecting individual rights but also as a means of ensuring checks and bal-
ances in the design and operation of the Social Credit System. 
The Social Credit System in a global context  
Key to understanding the history of rating in the West and the controversy over the So-
cial Credit System in China is the recognition that all systems are based on a certain 
combination of inputs and outputs, which may have strong normative or behavioural 
dimensions. As argued in an early account of the developing Social Credit System, 
drawing explicit links between developments in the West and in China, ‘in both Silicon 
Valley and in Beijing, there is this notion that we can use technology to shape and re-
shape incentives in such a way that people will behave better’.210 In this section, there-
fore, we situate the Social Credit System in a broader context, first identifying character, 
information systems, and participation as core concerns, before turning to explore the 
degree to which reputation-based systems can be regulated. In so exploring the pro-
spects for regulation, we draw again upon historical antecedents and developments in 
cognate areas (eg the power of online ‘platforms’ more generally), highlighting the im-
plications of the complexity discussed in the previous section. 
The history of credit registries and scores identifies a long-running ‘character’ dimen-
sion, including the desired impact upon consumer behaviour, the framing of a good 
credit score as a moral virtue, the use of data (via informants or otherwise) on personal 
character, and attempts to incorporate factors such as ‘honesty’ and ‘clean living’ into 
scoring.211 Sesame Credit may be novel if it makes use of video game playing as a sig-
nal,212 though American credit rating pioneers were well ahead of Alibaba in making 
careful note of alcohol consumption and gambling habits.213 The ways in which systems 
in China – or indeed experiments like Lenddo, using carefully chosen proxies214 – ad-
dress these issues is therefore not a difficult leap from this American history of scoring. 
Moreover, the linguistic similarities of the Mandarin terms discussed above (eg sinceri-
ty, honesty)215 emphasise a point also understood in the West (where credit – and indeed 
credibility – derive from the Latin ‘credere’, for trust or belief, with the Christian 
‘Creed’ taking its English name from its Latin opening words, ‘credo in unum Deum’ 
(I believe in one God). 
Furthermore, both the relatively uniform approach being worked up in China and the 
less obviously interconnected developments in the West can be understood as part of the 
continuing reverberations of how information systems now operate – that is, the main-
streaming of digital technologies and the vast amounts of data that are created (not just 
by institutions but by individuals). Such data can come through deliberate disclosure (eg 
on social media or by agreeing to take part in a loyalty scheme), but also through their 
data trails (eg browsing history, location data collected by an app) and through the ac-
tions of other individuals, and may be governed by data protection laws where in force.  
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The initiatives in China are influenced by a systems theory approach to information, 
paying special attention to flows and loops as an emerging modality of governance.216 
Unsurprisingly, some analysts of the Social Credit System ask questions about how the 
availability and reuse of reputational data, especially at the level of big data, affects the 
regulatory state itself217 – just as developments in information processing and manage-
ment, and theoretical consideration of systems theory approaches, informed Western 
approaches to governance during the post-1945 period218 and are at the heart of debate 
on the degree to which the Internet itself can be governed.219 The arguments that per-
formance management schemes have become normalised and so now require the analy-
sis of mission, commensuration, and vision,220 and that classifications embedded in in-
formation infrastructures require political and ethical study,221 are surely capable of ap-
plication to the various systems we discuss here, including those still in development.  
Finally, it can be noted that the centrality of ratings and reputation poses questions 
about the relationship between technology and representative democracy. In Europe and 
North America, one such iteration is speculation regarding whether new deployments of 
information technologies could support new or revitalised forms of public participa-
tion.222 As explained in the discussion of novel forms of credit scoring,223 the hypothesis 
that better use of a broader range of data democratises access to resources and markets 
is clearly present in the arguments of developers. In the case of China, although there is 
speculation whether China will democratise,224 this seems rather unlikely in the near 
future. So, while the Social Credit System may give Chinese citizens more control over 
the impact of their actions than previously,225 in China technology may rather be seen as 
an alternative to representative democracy. In other words, it is suggested that the Social 
Credit System can be one of the means used by ‘the center of figuring out what’s going 
on at lower levels and across society’ instead of relying on electoral feedback and relat-
ed forms of civil activism.226 
With these points in mind, we now turn to broader questions of how the technologies in 
use might be the subject of regulation. The innovation associated with recent develop-
ments in China provides a useful set of sub-questions that will inform the debate on how 
reputation-based systems ought to be regulated in the West. With key differences be-
tween conventional Western credit scoring and the Social Credit System including the 
use of a broader set of data, the enforcement of outcomes, and the use of devices and 
sensors to add real-time data,227 and the clear echoes of each of these points in the his-
torical evolution of credit and reputation schemes in the West (eg the impact of comput-
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erisation, or the link between reputation and continued use of a platform), these go be-
yond theoretical questions. Indeed, critiques of innovation both in the established credit 
sector and in social media228 demonstrate the types of concerns that will inform debate 
on the regulatory approach to reputation in the very near future. If these systems 
‘spread’ to other spheres of interaction and governance, lessons learned from earlier im-
plementations of reputation-led approaches will form an important part of the design 
process. 
A tension between centralised and distributed or fragmented reputation and rating sys-
tems is evident both in China and in the West. An overt form of centralisation appears 
more likely in the former (where private systems may be permitted limited autonomy 
within the context of an overarching system) than in the latter (where single systems of 
data are the subject of particular criticism, even where the same effect is achieved by 
less direct means).229 On the other hand, both the approach to development in China 
(which allows for regional and municipal variation)230 and the fashion for city- or sub-
city based experimentation with data collection and analysis in Western ‘smart city’ ini-
tiatives231 pose more difficult questions. Should the spread of reputation-based systems 
be seen as a type of policy diffusion?232 If so, could spatially limited initiatives avoid 
the worst effects of mass surveillance and allow for the impact of variations in design 
and implementation to be tested? Or are Western cities, as Greenfield argues, setting out 
the ‘material conditions … for Chinese-style social credit to spread’?233 To what extent 
does data protection law, even as updated, constrain such spreading? 
Although we have sought to explain the impact of intervention across a number of sub-
categories, it may be the case that a recommendation independent of context is not pos-
sible. Instead, the degree of intervention may be determined in light of overriding ques-
tions. What are the means by which accountability can be best secured? Is competition 
(and the pressure that it might create towards accuracy and relevance) appropriate? How 
can a system remain responsive (for instance, adaptable and flexible in light of techno-
logical developments or attempts to exploit a system inappropriately)?  
The primary locus of intervention is likely to be the provider of the rating system. In 
some cases, this will be a service provider or the administrator of a platform through 
which others provide services; in other cases, the platform may manage a rating system 
but not be involved in the delivery of a specific service. In both situations, the provider 
is likely to be a ‘data controller’ for the purposes of data protection law.  
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In the specific area of reputation systems, it has been recognised that the initial position 
that the ‘abundant information’ available makes intervention unnecessary has come un-
der challenge, especially on the grounds of transparency and accountability.234 The con-
tinuing evolution of data-driven approaches to reputation also requires further study of 
the impact of measurement upon behaviour, including the creation of perverse incen-
tives and non-productive attempts to ‘game’ systems.235 
We have already seen a refocusing of regulatory efforts in the European Union towards 
platforms of various sorts, which provides some guidance on possible approaches for 
rating systems. A good example is online dispute resolution, where a Regulation and 
Directive of 2013 sets standards for approved dispute resolution providers (ie expertise, 
independence and impartiality; transparency; effectiveness; fairness; legality; liberty) 
and requires others to link to or cooperate with approved providers.236 More recent 
scoping work by the European Commission identifies a broad category of ‘platforms’ 
which have increasing significance and influence, for which existing legal tools in fields 
such as competition and liability may alone be suboptimal.237 Similarly, there is a lively 
debate on the regulation of emerging applications of artificial intelligence,238 going be-
yond the specific issues of automation dealt with (to some extent) by existing law and 
overlapping with calls for accountability and transparency regarding the use of algo-
rithms,239 which without attention may make ‘decisions … inscrutable and thereby in-
contestable’.240 These developments recognise a preference for co-regulatory models, 
relying upon the setting of standards, the involvement of industry but also public au-
thorities, and the pursuit of broad objectives rather than a prescriptive approach. Note 
too that much of the legal complexity of the developing system in China is found in the 
interaction between different emanations of the state and between state and non-state 
entities.241 
In concluding this contextual analysis of reputation systems, it is helpful to recall a re-
cent debate in the field of law and development − the rapid economic development of 
China and the possible role of Western-style law in promoting it.242 Here then the Social 
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Credit System may indicate a paradigm shift in both aspects of this causal relationship: 
it challenges us to move beyond Western-style law and it poses the question how a sys-
tem that also promotes social development can be designed. Shaming, to give one ex-
ample, is a powerful feature of Internet communications, whether in a formal sense as 
under development in China243 or for all users, especially of social media.244 The 
presentation of the Social Credit System as farfetched or as an exemplar of State control 
of information is not just complacent; it ignores the longer history of reputational in-
formation in various Western contexts, and the degree to which similar phenomena have 
taken on significance, albeit with different levels of intervention, in transnational e-
commerce and sharing platforms (and in the most recent attempts to reuse or merge da-
ta). For example, the unfinished business of whether new approaches to reputation pro-
mote access to finance for the 21st century ‘honest but poor’ of China or the 19th century 
hardworking immigrant to the United States, or constitute a new threat of further dis-
crimination – or both – requires a less complacent approach. Consideration of what is 
underway in China can therefore, for instance, prompt productive discussion of the ade-
quacy and focus of existing regulatory mechanisms in the West – especially at a time of 
unprecedented scrutiny of the ethics of Silicon Valley and the implications of the digital 
revolution. 
CONCLUSION 
In English-language newspapers a common frame of discussing the Chinese Social 
Credit System is an episode of the science fiction series ‘Black Mirror’.245 This episode, 
Nosedive, imagines a future society in which every citizen has a rating from ‘0’ to ‘5’ 
which derives from the subjective assessments made by everyone else using a mobile 
phone app. This rating then has a social function (in the episode: who gets invited to a 
wedding party), but it also determines commercial decisions (in the episode, for exam-
ple, the type of car you can hire or neighbourhood in which you can live) and access to 
public services (in the episode: in prioritising medical treatment). At its extreme, the 
rights of the individual are at stake; the episode closes with the main character’s score 
dropping to zero, and so removed from the ‘platform’ – through the removal of the 
lenses that provide, in the style of augmented reality, real-time access to data – and, ap-
parently, imprisoned. 
The intuitive parallel to the Chinese system is that, here too, individuals are rated with a 
single score and that this score can have a variety of consequences. However, there are 
some profound differences. The most obvious one is that the Social Credit System is not 
based on the subjective ratings of other citizens. Indeed, it may be said that this subjec-
tivity is closer to the contemporary Western ratings such as Uber and Airbnb than the 
more objective (and more algorithmic) emerging Chinese one. Moreover, from a norma-
tive perspective, a recent newspaper article notes: ‘No, China isn’t Black Mirror – social 
credit scores are more complex and sinister than that’ given that in ‘China and else-
where, the implied threat isn’t the tyranny of the crowd, but state and corporate pow-
er’.246 In support of this mere acceptance of contemporary Western ratings, it could also 
                                                 
243 See text to notes 98-116, above, as well as text to note 151 (for cross-cultural differences in shame 
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244 eg J. Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed (London: Picador, 2016). 
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246 ‘No, China isn’t Black Mirror – social credit scores are more complex and sinister than that’ New 
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be said that it is just a normal feature of human societies that we depend on the subjec-
tive judgments of others, regardless whether this is quantified or not.  
Yet, this negative comparative assessment of the Social Credit System may not be a 
matter of course. Ratings initiated by the state or companies may be designed in such a 
way that they provide targeted incentives (not simply ‘being nice’ as in the Black Mir-
ror episode – which is silent on how the system came about or who controls it). It may 
also be an advantage that ‘interventionist’ or centrally planned rating systems can more 
easily be shaped and controlled by law and regulation. This is relevant for the Chinese 
context as the Social Credit System is in a transitional stage with its current mix of Chi-
na-wide blacklists and ratings by pilot cities and financial institutions. It is also relevant 
for Western countries where, at present, public authorities are more likely to engage 
with rating and reputation systems through acquiescence or encouragement, and only 
sometimes through regulation, which may be indirect.  
Thus, in this article, we argue that the Chinese models (not model) of new approaches to 
credit should be studied in the West, not as a template or even a counter-model, but as 
illustrations of the implications of today’s emphasis upon quantification and reputation 
across a range of domains, personal and official. Such illustrations can also inform law-
making efforts in the West. Specifically, this article addressed some of the core general 
issues that law makers should consider. We discussed eight aspects where regulatory 
differences can be observed: drafters, users, aims, scoring systems, application, use of 
algorithms, enforcement and accountability. We also indicated that law making in this 
field can be either through the introduction of a new regulatory regime or the applica-
tion of general requirements to a particular context. It may also be unlikely that there 
will be a single ‘law on ratings’ given the relevance of many overlapping policy consid-
erations and corresponding fields of law, such as e-commerce law, privacy and data pro-
tection law, anti-discrimination law, tort law, competition law, sector specific regula-
tions on financial services, and so forth.  
Finally, we suggest that where there is a need for regulation, the first focus should be on 
the provider of the rating system. This should also incorporate means by which ac-
countability can be best secured, such as forms of online dispute resolution but also the 
availability of conventional judicial scrutiny. Importantly, any law making in this field 
also needs to be done with full understanding of the technological and behavioural as-
pects of the rating systems under consideration: for example, we have noted problems 
of validity, reliability and responsiveness, including attempts to ‘game’ systems. Thus, 
this calls for not only a comparative but also an interdisciplinary perspective, as we also 
aspired to in this article. Rating systems have been commercially and socially important 
in different ways in China and elsewhere, and so questions of regulation require not just 
attention to the systems currently used in one context (or on an apparently voluntary 
basis), but to the ways in which they are likely to develop, through taking on additional 
functions or more ambitious types of aggregation. 
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